About the Conference
One of the goals of the 1934 Security and Exchange Act was to promote shareholder democracy through the proxy ballot. Ninety years later, this goal is far from being achieved. The rise of index funds has concentrated an enormous amount of voting power in just a few hands. Is corporate democracy desirable? What are its costs and benefits? Is it feasible in the face of the enormous concentration of voting power and the rational apathy of voters? What can we learn from political democracy? Is corporate democracy a form of plutocracy? The conference invites papers on all these themes.
The conference keynote will be delivered by Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart (Harvard University.)
This conference results from the merger of the conferences on Political Economy of Finance previously organized by PolEconFin and the Stigler Center, respectively. This revamped conference series will be held annually and will alternate between Europe and the United States.
The event, jointly hosted by the Stigler Center and The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), aims to bring together researchers active at the intersections between Economics, Finance, Political Science, and Law.
Call for Papers
Papers are now being accepted on topics related to corporate democracy.
To submit a paper for consideration, you must first create an account with the Ex Ordo submission site.
DEADLINE: Papers must be submitted through our Ex Ordo portal by June 30 (11:59pm CT Chicago time).
Authors will be notified in August.
Conference Organizers
Thomas Lambert, Associate Professor of Finance, Erasmus University
Magdalena Rola-Janicka, Assistant Professor of Finance, Imperial College London; CEPR
Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago; CEPR
Conference Venue:
Gleacher Center
450 Cityfront Plaza Dr, Chicago, IL 60611
For more information, contact:
Rachel Piontek, Senior Associate Director, Stigler Center